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April

EUFBC Seminar - Valentino D Angelo

21 april - 21 april

12:00 - 13:00

https://ju-se.zoom.us/j/68855796991

<p>Welcome to join the 18th EuFBC seminar titled &quot;<strong>Family Agents&quot; </strong>presented by Valentino D&rsquo;Angelo (Mario Daniele&nbsp;Amore and&nbsp;Alessandro Minichilli), from&nbsp;AIDAF-EY Chair in Strategic Management<br />in Family Business in memory of Alberto Falck,&nbsp;<strong>Bocconi University.</strong></p><p>ABSTRACT &ndash;&nbsp;Several firms around the world are led by multiple CEOs. This observation has spurred a literature on the strategic implications of shared leadership. Our study investigates how co-CEOs affect corporate investment under different conditions of ownership and governance. We argue that, while family firms have more parsimonious investment policies than non-family firms, the presence of multiple CEOs raises overinvestment in family firms due to a potential divergence of personal agendas. Our analysis confirms that co-CEOs are conducive of excessive investment activities in family firms. Yet, we find that the positive effect of co-CEOs on family firms&rsquo; overinvestment is lower when the firm is subject to strong board monitoring, and higher when the co-CEOs belong to different family branches. Contrary to the view that family actors represent a homogeneous group with aligned interests and preferences, our study shows that the fragmentation of leadership among multiple actors may be costly for the family business.</p><p>Discussant: Institute of Family Business and Mittelstand<br />&ndash;&ndash; WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management</p>
21 april - 21 april
12:00 - 13:00

Location

https://ju-se.zoom.us/j/68855796991


Link

EUFBC Seminar - Valentino D Angelo

Welcome to join the 18th EuFBC seminar titled "Family Agents" presented by Valentino D’Angelo (Mario Daniele Amore and Alessandro Minichilli), from AIDAF-EY Chair in Strategic Management
in Family Business in memory of Alberto Falck, Bocconi University.

ABSTRACT – Several firms around the world are led by multiple CEOs. This observation has spurred a literature on the strategic implications of shared leadership. Our study investigates how co-CEOs affect corporate investment under different conditions of ownership and governance. We argue that, while family firms have more parsimonious investment policies than non-family firms, the presence of multiple CEOs raises overinvestment in family firms due to a potential divergence of personal agendas. Our analysis confirms that co-CEOs are conducive of excessive investment activities in family firms. Yet, we find that the positive effect of co-CEOs on family firms’ overinvestment is lower when the firm is subject to strong board monitoring, and higher when the co-CEOs belong to different family branches. Contrary to the view that family actors represent a homogeneous group with aligned interests and preferences, our study shows that the fragmentation of leadership among multiple actors may be costly for the family business.

Discussant: Institute of Family Business and Mittelstand
–– WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management


Organizer: Centre for Family Entrepreneurship and Ownership

CeFEO Research Seminar

26 april - 26 april

12:00 - 13:00

Via Zoom: https://ju-se.zoom.us/my/cefeo

<p>TBC</p>
26 april - 26 april
12:00 - 13:00

Location

Via Zoom: https://ju-se.zoom.us/my/cefeo


Link

CeFEO Research Seminar

TBC


Organizer: Centre for Family Entrepreneurship and Ownership